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1. F.R. Files, Jr., The “I Didn’t Know It Was on My Hard Drive” Objection, THE FED.
CORNER, Jan.–Feb. 2007, http://bainfiles.com/CM/Articles/The-Federal-Corner-January-February-
2007.asp (last visited Sept. 10, 2008).
2. 469 F.3d 853 (9th Cir. 2006).
3. Id. at 856.
4. See id. at 862 (noting Kuchinski never argued that he did not access the images from the
Internet).
5. See id. (noting that Kuchinski never argued a lack of control over his computer). In fact,
Kuchinski had full ability to control and manipulate the images as he searched for them and held
them on his computer screen; see infra text accompanying notes 61–63.
6. Kuchinski, 469 F.3d at 861–62. For an explanation of the intricacies of the process, see
infra text accompanying notes 60–75.
7. Kuchinski, 469 F.3d at 861–62.
8. See Files, supra note 1.
9. See infra notes 61–66 and accompanying text.
10. Id.
11. See infra Part IV.
VI. CONCLUSION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1235
I.  INTRODUCTION
“For years, defense lawyers have argued the ‘young and stupid’ semi-
defense for their youthful clients. Now, we can have the ‘I didn’t know it
was on the hard drive’ objection for the unsophisticated computer user in
child pornography cases—or at least they can in the 9th Circuit.”1
This quote, appearing on the website of an East Texas criminal defense
law firm, refers to the outcome of United States v. Kuchinski.  In2
Kuchinski, the defendant’s computer contained, in various forms, more
than 15,000 images of child pornography.  There was no question that3
Kuchinski’s volitional viewing of the images on the Internet was the
sources of those images.  No one argued that Kuchinski did not have4
control over his computer while he searched for the 15,000 images or
while he looked at them on his computer screen.  However, Kuchinski5
successfully argued that he lacked knowledge of a computer mechanism
that automatically downloads any images viewed while a user surfs the
Internet.  Ultimately, Kuchinski was convicted for possession of only 1106
of the 15,000 images.7
The result of Kuchinski is a new defense for willing users of child
pornography: lack of knowledge regarding the inner workings of their
computers,  even though a user does not need any advanced computer8
knowledge to search, view, and control web images.  These volitional9
searches for child pornography provide a user with access to and control
over child pornography images.  Courts have struggled with such facts,10 11
2
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12. Webster’s Dictionary defines possession, amongst others, as “actual physical control.”
WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 1770 (1993).
13. Black’s Law Dictionary defines possession as “[t]he fact of having or holding property
in one’s power; the exercise of dominion over property.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1201 (8th ed.
2004). Constructive possession is defined as “[c]ontrol or dominion over a property without actual
possession or custody of it.” Id.
14. See infra Part III.
15. See id.
16. This Note assumes that the court has separately determined whether the material
constitutes child pornography and will not discuss the factors considered in that determination. 
questioning whether it is sound public policy to allow the user to escape
liability for possession of child pornography because the user remains
ignorant about computers.
This problem is easily identified but much less easily eliminated. The
concept of “possession” seems intuitive when one thinks of a physical
object: holding something, touching it, feeling it, having it physically
present.  Therefore, mere viewing, even window-shopping, does not12
constitute possession of what is on the other side of the glass because one
cannot hold it, touch it, or feel it. Even though the legal definition of
possession sets forth constraints that limit this basic idea, the general
intuition behind possessing an item does not change.  In contrast, the13
concept of possessing something digital is more elusive. Looking at
materials on a computer screen might seem more like window-shopping
than physical interaction with the materials. However, surfing the Internet
involves significant interaction and exchange of information between a
user’s computer and the web servers visited.  Furthermore, the user14
retains a significant level of control over the information on the
computer.15
This Note examines the concept of electronic possession in the field of
child pornography, with the aim of reconciling the basic intuition behind
possession with the reality of electronic data.  Part II briefly discusses the16
case and statutory history that placed child pornography outside the
bounds of the First Amendment and led to constitutionally valid
prohibitions on the possession of child pornography. Part III sets forth the
various ways in which individuals can access electronic child
pornography, with a focus on the user’s level of interaction. Part IV
discusses factors that the courts have considered in defining what
constitutes possession of electronic child pornography and critically
analyzes two leading court opinions. Part V suggests a test that can be
uniformly applied to any situation giving rise to possession of child
pornography and discusses how the analysis of previous cases might have
been different under the proposed test.
3
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17. See Swearingen v. United States, 161 U.S. 446, 449–50 (1896) (reviewing a charge
against defendant for mailing an article that was described to be “obscene, lewd, and lascivious”).
In 1948, Congress enacted 18 U.S.C. § 1461 into the Criminal Code, prohibiting the mailing of
obscene, lewd, or lascivious materials. 18 U.S.C. § 1461 (current version at 18 U.S.C. § 1461
(2006)); Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S. 87, 91 (1974). Prosecutions related to child
pornography proceeded under § 1461. See infra note 22 (discussing the prosecution of possession
of child pornography under obscenity statutes).
18. 354 U.S. 476 (1957).
19. Id. at 485; see also § 1461 (prohibiting the mailing of obscene, lewd or lascivious
materials). 
20. Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 559 (1969).
21. Id. at 565. Compare id. with Roth, 354 U.S. at 483 (commenting that at the time of the
First Amendment’s adoption, obscenity was outside the protection intended for speech and press).
22. See Protection of Children Against Sexual Exploitation Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-225,
§ 2251, 92 Stat. 7 (1978). Until 1977, child pornography offenses were prosecuted only under
obscenity statutes, and some prosecutions proceeded under § 1461 even after the enactment of
§ 2251. See United States v. Kussmaul, 987 F.2d 345, 347 n.1 (6th Cir. 1993) (prosecuting under
§ 1461).
23. United States v. Langford, 688 F.2d 1088, 1092 (7th Cir. 1982) (“[C]hild pornography
like other sexually explicit material had to be determined obscene.”). In determining whether child
pornography was obscene, the Court applied the obscenity test articulated in Miller v. California.
Id. at 1093 (citing Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973)). The Miller test asked:
(a) whether ‘the average person, applying contemporary community standards’
would find that the work, taken as a whole, appeals to the prurient interest; (b)
whether the work depicts or describes, in a patently offensive way, sexual conduct
specifically defined by the applicable state law; and (c) whether the work, taken
II. REGULATION OF CHILD PORNOGRAPHY
As early as the 1800s, Congress addressed the legality of obscene
materials, a subset of which is child pornography.  In Roth v. United17
States,  the Supreme Court declared that “obscenity is not within the area18
of constitutionally protected speech.”  In 1969, the Supreme Court struck19
down a Georgia statute that criminalized the possession of obscene
materials.  Though reasserting its prior position that the First Amendment20
does not protect obscenity, the Court held that “[i]f the First Amendment
means anything, it means that a State has no business telling a man, sitting
alone in his own house, what books he may read or what films he may
watch.”  21
In the next decade, Congress enacted the Protection of Children
Against Sexual Exploitation Act of 1977, which banned obscene child
pornography.  At this time, it was possible for materials involving child22
pornography to be deemed not obscene; therefore these prosecutions
required proof of obscenity.  In New York v. Ferber,  the Supreme Court23 24
4
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as a whole, lacks serious literary, artistic, political or scientific value. 
Miller, 413 U.S. at 24 (internal citations omitted).
24. 458 U.S. 747 (1982).
25. N.Y. PENAL LAW § 263.15 (McKinney 1977) (current version at N.Y. PENAL LAW
§ 263.15 (McKinney 2008)).
26. Ferber, 458 U.S. at 778.
27. Id. at 760–61 (stating that because the strong interest involved was protecting the children
used to make child pornography, the obscene quality of the matter “[bore] no connection to the
issue”).
28. See, e.g., Osborne v. Ohio, 495 U.S. 103, 109 n.4 (1990).
29. Id. at 110–11.
30. See id. at 111; see also OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2907.323(A)(3) (West 2008).
31. Osborne, 495 U.S. at 111.
32. Id. at 109.
33. Id. at 109–10 (citing Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 567–68 (1969)); see supra text
accompanying notes 20–21.
34. See Osborne, 495 U.S. at 111.
35. Child Protection Act of 1984, 18 U.S.C. § 2252 (2006).
36. Child Pornography Prevention Act of 1996, 18 U.S.C. § 2252(a) (2006).
37. See also Henry Cohen, Child Pornography: Constitutional Principles and Federal
upheld a New York statute  that banned the dissemination of child25
pornography without requiring proof that the images were obscene.  In26
upholding New York’s ban on child pornography distribution, the
Supreme Court focused on the long-lasting detrimental effects on the
children involved and rejected the defendant’s contention that states
should only be allowed to ban obscene materials generally.27
In the years following New York v. Ferber, states continued to
prosecute distribution of child pornography.  The result was that the child28
pornography dissemination moved to an underground market, and, in an
effort to decrease demand and production, the states responded by
proscribing possession of child pornography.  In 1989, the Supreme Court29
reviewed a challenge to an Ohio statute that proscribed both the possession
and the viewing of child pornography.  The Court upheld the statute.30 31
First, the Court identified the state’s interest in protecting the underage
victims of child pornography.  It distinguished that strong interest from32
the “weak” concern for the effects of obscene materials on the mind of the
viewer—a concern it had rejected in Stanley v. Georgia.  The Court thus33
allowed the state to ban possession as a means of controlling child abuse
caused by the production and distribution of child pornography.  Bans on34
the mere possession of child pornography thereby became valid.
Federal child pornography statutes currently are codified at 18 U.S.C.
§§ 2251–2260 (2006). Specifically, possession of child pornography is
banned by § 2252  and § 2252A  (Child Pornography Prevention Act of35 36
1996).  Many states also prohibit possession of child pornography.  The37 38
5
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Statutes, in GOVERNMENTAL PRINCIPLES AND STATUTES ON CHILD PORNOGRAPHY 1, 7, 10 (Walker
T. Holliday ed., 2003). Sections 2252 and 2252A operate independently to proscribe knowing
possession in similar, although not identical, words. Compare 18 U.S.C. § 2252(a)(4)(B)(i-ii)
(applying to child pornography depicting actual children), with 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(a)(5)(B)
(applying to child pornography that is also computer-generated), and 18 U.S.C. § 2256 (defining
“visual depiction” and “child pornography”).
38. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 13A-12-192(b) (2008) (“Any person who knowingly
possesses . . . shall be guilty . . . .” (emphasis added)); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-3553(A)(2)
(2008) (“A person commits sexual exploitation of a minor by knowingly . . . possessing . . . .”
(emphasis added)); FLA. STAT. § 827.071(5) (2008) (“It is unlawful for any person to knowingly
possess . . . .” (emphasis added)); TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-17-1003(a)(1)–(2) (2008) (“It is unlawful
for any person to knowingly possess . . . .” (emphasis added)). 
39. See supra note 38 and accompanying text.
40. See supra notes 37–38 and accompanying text. 
41. See United States v. Romm, 455 F.3d 990, 998 (9th Cir. 2006) (citing United States v.
Tucker (Tucker II), 305 F.3d 1193, 1204 (10th Cir. 2002)); see also Strouse v. State, 932 So. 2d
326, 329 (Fla. 4th DCA 2006) (citing United States v. Perez, 247 F. Supp. 2d 459, 484 n.12
(S.D.N.Y. 2003)). Arguably, the creation of the Internet has allowed for the dissemination of child
pornography on a new and larger scale, thus forcing courts to examine existing analyses and apply
them to new scenarios. See Jessica McCausland, Note, Regulating Computer Crime After Reno v.
ACLU: The Myth of Additional Regulation, 49 FLA. L. REV. 483, 491 (1997) (noting that “[despite
all the concern, some courts have had little trouble applying established concepts to the new factual
situations presented by the internet”).
42. For purposes of this Note, “to access an image” means viewing it on a computer without
necessarily having intentionally saved a copy of the image onto the computer. See, e.g.,
Commonwealth v. Diodoro, 932 A.2d 172, 174 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2007). “Downloading” will refer
to the intentional act by the user to create a copy of the image on his hard drive. See, e.g., United
States v. Riccardi, 258 F. Supp. 2d 1212, 1224 (D. Kan. 2003).
43. State v. Morris, No. 04CA0036, 2005 WL 356801, at *1 (Ohio Ct. App. Feb. 16, 2005)
(noting that witnesses discussed searches that are used to arrive at web site images of child
pornography).
44. See MAX TAYLOR & ETHEL QUAYLE, CHILD PORNOGRAPHY: AN INTERNET CRIME 162
(2003) (discussing identifiers). 
language of the various statutes is quite similar.  Importantly, the Federal39
statute and various state statutes proscribe only knowing possession.  The40
similarities have allowed courts applying the statutes to look beyond their
jurisdictions for authority on what constitutes possession of child
pornography.41
III.  ACCESSING CHILD PORNOGRAPHY42
A.  Searching for Child Pornography
Child pornography may be found by searching the Internet.  The43
names of child pornography files, like many other computer files,
commonly reference their content.  Common child pornography-related44
Internet search terms include “illegal[,] preteen[,] underage[,] lolita[,]
6
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45. Morris, 2005 WL 356801, at *5. “‘Lolita’ is often a code word for child pornography.”
United States v. Grimes, 244 F.3d 375, 379 n.7 (5th Cir. 2001).
46. See Morris, 2005 WL 356801, at *5 (“[T]hese search terms were commonly used in
attempts to locate child pornography on the Internet.”).
47. See U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, FILE SHARING PROGRAMS: USERS OF PEER-TO-PEER
NETWORKS CAN READILY ACCESS CHILD PORNOGRAPHY 11 (2004), available at
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d04757t.pdf [hereinafter GAO REPORT] (discussing “innocuous
searches” that may lead to child pornography). 
48. See Commonwealth v. Diodoro, 932 A.2d 172, 174 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2007) (addressing
defendant’s claim that he did not download images to his computer, rather he solely viewed the
images online).
49. United States v. Riccardi, 258 F. Supp. 2d 1212, 1224 (D. Kan. 2003). 
50. Id.
51. See United States v. Griffin, 482 F.3d 1008, 1010 (8th Cir. 2007) (addressing the
utilization of Kazaa, a file-sharing network); Riccardi, 258 F. Supp. 2d at 1224 (considering the
utilization of AOL).
52. See, e.g., United States v. Carani, 492 F.3d 867, 871 (7th Cir. 2007) (stating two of the
files were “accessed through a web browser”).
53. GAO REPORT, supra note 47, at 17. Simply put, these programs provide a meeting place
where the users can search the files of others and download them. Id. at 16–17. The user prompts
both the search and the download. See id.; see also Carani, 492 F.3d at 869. The program searches,
then returns a list of available matches for the user’s criteria and provides the user with information
about the files. Id.
kiddy[,] child[, and] incest[.]”  These terms specifically refer to child45
pornography and differ from terms associated with adult pornography.46
As such, a user seeking child pornography can direct a search to
specifically yield child pornography. However, it is possible for a child
pornography image to be mislabeled.  Therefore, a user seeking to47
download only adult pornography, who did not input any child-related
search terms, could inadvertently find child pornography.
B.  Downloading Images
The Internet provides multiple avenues to access child pornography.
The methods can be categorized as those that involve the viewing of child
pornography off an Internet server versus those that involve downloading
the image to the user’s computer.  As the term is generally used,48
downloading an image requires a positive effort by the viewer to make a
copy of the image in his hard drive.  The person must instruct the49
computer to save or download the image and designate where it should
store the image.  Case law reveals that child pornography consumers use50
a wide variety of methods to download images.  Users can use a web51
browser to download images directly off the websites.  File sharing52
programs such as Kazaa and BearShare allow users to share files by
downloading them from another user’s computer.  Images can also be53
7
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54. GAO REPORT, supra note 47, at 1. 
55. See TAYLOR & QUAYLE, supra note 44, at 166. Newsgroups are classified by interests.
See id. The user can seek out the appropriate group through which to access child pornography. See
id.
56. See United States v. White, 506 F.3d 635, 638 (8th Cir. 2007) (noting that defendant
copied images of child pornography onto disks, which he labeled and stored).
57. See, e.g., United States v. Riccardi, 258 F. Supp. 2d 1212, 1224 (D. Kan. 2003)
(addressing a situation in which a user “unzipped” files to save them on his computer).
58. See TAYLOR & QUAYLE, supra note 44, at 85 (“One function of the Internet in relation
to this was that images could be downloaded and changed, to meet the needs of the collector . . . .”);
see also United States v. Tucker (Tucker I), 150 F. Supp. 2d 1263, 1267 (D. Utah 2001) (discussing
the ways in which a user can control the image).
59. See, e.g., Tucker I, 150 F. Supp. 2d at 1265 (noting the affirmative steps taken to delete
images). 
60. See, e.g., id. (addressing a situation in which pornographic pictures were stored on the
defendant’s computer cache file). 
61. See id.
62. See id. at 1267.
63. Id.; see supra note 58 and accompanying text.
64. Defendants often argue that mere viewing of child pornography online, without
downloading, does not constitute possession of child pornography. See, e.g., United States v.
Romm, 455 F.3d 990, 993–94 (9th Cir. 2006); United States v. Tucker (Tucker II), 305 F.3d 1193,
1204 (10th Cir. 2002); United States v. Bunnell, No. CRIM. 02-13-B-S, 2002 WL 927765, at *1
transferred between computer users through Internet chat groups  or54
newsgroups.  Finally, images can be obtained, copied, or transferred by55
the use of removable storage such as CDs, floppy disks, or flash drives.56
Once saved to the computer’s hard drive, the saved image becomes part
of the data on the computer and can be accessed at any time without an
Internet connection.  At this point, the user controls the image’s destiny:57
The user can enlarge it, zoom in, zoom out, rotate it, print it, share it, edit
it, and delete it.  In fact, even if the user decides not to look at an image58
ever again, the image will remain on the computer until the user takes
affirmative steps to delete it.59
C.  Viewing Images on the Internet Without Downloading and the
Problematic Side-Effect: Cache Memory
The user may choose to view the images on the Internet without
downloading them onto the hard drive.  Websites featuring child60
pornography include thumbnails that the viewer can enlarge.  While the61
image is on the viewer’s screen, the user is in control of the image.  The62
viewer can undertake largely the same actions as if the image had been
downloaded: He can enlarge it, zoom in or out, rotate it, print it, copy it to
his computer, and show it to others.  Nevertheless, at this point, despite63
the user’s apparent control over the image, the average defendant will still
argue that he does not possess child pornography.  64
8
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(D. Me. May 10, 2002); Ward v. State, No. CR-05-1277, 2007 WL 1228169, at *2 (Ala. Crim. App.
Apr. 27, 2007); Commonwealth v. Diodoro, 932 A.2d 172, 174 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2007); State v.
Pickett, No. M2004-00732-CCA-R3-CD, 2005 WL 2438385, at *6 (Tenn. Crim. App. Oct. 3,
2005).
65. Ward, 2007 WL 1228169, at *9.
66. Crucially, these processes are simultaneous, but separate. The image on the computer
screen remains on the screen by virtue of the random-access memory (RAM), the memory that
operates when files or programs are running. However, despite being identical to the image that was
on the screen, the image in the cache is just a copy of that other image and is thus a completely
different image. See Tucker I, 150 F. Supp. 2d at 1265 n.2 (discussing the functioning of a
computer’s cache). 
67. See JIM HANDY, THE CACHE MEMORY BOOK 9 (2d ed. 1998). Court opinions and
scholarly articles do not usually discuss this fact. Ty E. Howard, Don’t Cache Out Your Case:
Prosecuting Child Pornography Possession Laws Based on Images Located in Temporary Internet
Files, 19 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1227, 1249 (2004). A possible reason is that the average defendant
does not seem to be visiting the same images more than once, thus making it irrelevant. See, e.g.,
Tucker I, 150 F. Supp. 2d at 1265 (noting a defendant’s statement that new images are always
available). At the same time, depending on the approach taken to determine possession, this fact
could complicate the analysis of the element of knowledge. See Howard supra at 1240–43
(discussing the difficulties of proving the element of knowledge where the defendant argues a lack
of knowledge as to the workings of the cache).
68. See Commonwealth v. Simone, No. CRIM. 03-0986, 2003 WL 22994238, at *3 (Va. Cir.
Ct. Nov. 12, 2003), rev’d, No. 0551-04-1, 2005 WL 588257, at *4 (Va. Ct. App. Mar. 15, 2005)
(reversing conviction because the user “did not have sufficient dominion and control over the
computer on [the date alleged in the indictment]”).
69. See id. (“[T]here is no mechanism on the computer screen that notifies a user . . . .”).
70. See id.
However, to speed up repeat viewing of a previously visited website,
computers automatically make a copy of the data from visited websites in
the form of “temporary Internet files” and store the data in what is called
the “cache.”  Therefore, the first time a user visits a website two65
simultaneous processes occur: (1) the computer opens the website and
shows it on the screen, and (2) the computer creates a copy of all the data
on that website and stores it in the cache.  When the user revisits the66
website, the computer compares the date on the website to the date on the
previously stored temporary file; if unchanged, the computer displays the
cached file on the screen, but, if the website has been updated, the
computer displays the data from the website.  67
This process occurs automatically, without any prompting by the user,
any time an Internet user visits any website; thus, it is generally outside the
control of Internet users.  In fact, since there is no indication to the user68
that this process is occurring, a computer user could take full advantage of
the Internet-surfing capabilities of his computer without ever learning what
is happening behind the scenes.  Although it is possible to deactivate the69
cache function of a computer, the average computer user does not know
how or why the process works.  Even users that have a general idea of the70
9
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71. See United States v. Kuchinski, 469 F.3d 853, 862 (9th Cir. 2006).
72. See id. Accessing the cache requires the user to know its location and to override system
warnings. United States v. Romm, 455 F.3d 990, 998 (9th Cir. 2006). 
73. Compare United States v. Tucker (Tucker II), 305 F.3d 1193, 1204–05 (10th Cir. 2002)
(“Anything [a user] could do with any other file he could do with [the pornographic] files.”), with
supra text accompanying note 58 (discussing the scope of control a user has in manipulating
images).
74. Web browsers offer an option to clean that cache with a few simple clicks. In Internet
Explorer, for example, it is located in the “General” tab of the “Internet Options” menu which is
in turn located under the “Tools” menu. In Firefox, the user can click “Tools” and then “Clear
Private Data” in order to clear the cache.
75. Romm, 455 F.3d at 995. Specifically, when the cache becomes full, the files in the cache
are deleted one by one, with the oldest one being deleted first. HANDY, supra note 67, at 9. 
76. See Fabiano v. Armstrong, 141 P.3d 907, 908 (Colo. Ct. App. 2006) (noting a user’s
receipt of child pornography images via e-mail).
77. See United States v. Perez, 247 F. Supp. 2d 459, 465 (S.D.N.Y. 2003); Fabiano, 141 P.3d
at 908.
process’s function and operation might not know how to prevent it.  A71
user needs advanced computer skills to directly access files in the cache
while the computer is offline.  Once properly accessed from inside the72
computer, however, temporary files are, for all relevant purposes, real files
that contain images that can be managed and manipulated like any other
file, independent of an Internet connection.  Finally, the cache can be73
easily deleted through the web browser without any special knowledge,74
or it can be deleted as part of routine computer maintenance.75
D.  Somewhere in the Middle: E-mail as a Source
Images of child pornography can be sent as attachments to e-mail.76
Viewers can solicit these e-mails by subscribing to chat rooms or websites
that send e-mails to their subscribers.  It is also possible for Internet users77
to receive unsolicited e-mails containing child pornography. Depending on
the program that the computer operator uses to access e-mails, the
attachment , like the cache, might be automatically downloaded onto the
computer or can instead be held by a remote server from which the user
can manually download or access it at any time. Either way, the user can
choose to keep or delete any solicited or unsolicited e-mails he receives.
He can therefore willingly choose what e-mails and attachments he keeps,
even if he could not control the receipt of the e-mails.
IV.  THE COURTS’ APPROACH TO POSSESSION
A.  Overview of Factors Considered by the Courts
Courts’ approaches to determining whether a defendant possessed child
pornography have lacked uniformity and consistency. Because courts
10
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78. See infra notes 80–83 and accompanying text. 
79. Compare United States v. Romm, 455 F.3d 990, 1000–01 (9th Cir. 2006) (finding
possession based on defendant’s admission that he had some knowledge of the cache but with no
indication that he actually had enough knowledge to access the cache), with United States v.
Kuchinski, 469 F.3d 853, 862–63 (9th Cir. 2006) (finding no possession of images in cache where
defendant argued that he had no knowledge whatsoever of the cache), and with State v. Jensen, 173
P.3d 1046, 1050, 1052–53 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2008) (finding that that there could be knowing receipt
of images of child pornography regardless of whether the defendant “intended to save them or knew
his computer was saving them”).
80. See, e.g., United States v. Tucker (Tucker I), 150 F. Supp. 2d 1263, 1266–67 (D. Utah
2001).
81. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Simone, No. 03-0986, 2003 WL 22994238, at *32 (Va. Cir.
Ct. Nov. 12, 2003) (“The Court also observes that asking whether a defendant has reached out for
and controlled the images recognizes and promotes the purpose behind the statute.”); see also State
v. Pickett, No. M2004-00732-CCA-R3-CD, 2005 WL 2438385, at *7 (Tenn. Crim. App. Oct. 3,
2005) (“[T]he printout demonstrates that the appellant repeatedly reached out for these websites
in order to access the images . . . .”).
82. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Gardner, 72 Va. Cir. 497, 498 (Va. Cir. Ct. 2007). 
83. See, e.g., United States v. Bass, 411 F.3d 1198, 1207 (10th Cir. 2005). 
84. See Romm, 455 F.3d at 998 (noting the defendant’s ability to keep the image on the
screen, enlarge, copy, print, e-mail, and delete); Tucker I, 150 F. Supp. 2d at 1267 (noting
defendant’s ability to “detain [images] on his monitor as long as he liked,” enlarge, manipulate,
copy, zoom, show to others, and delete); Ward v. State, No. CR-05-1277, 2007 WL 1228169, at
*3 (Ala. Crim. App. Apr. 27, 2007) (noting that defendant had the ability to copy, print, and e-
mail);  Commonwealth v. Diodoro, 932 A.2d 172, 174–75 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2007) (noting defendant’s
affirmative “actions of operating the computer mouse, locating the Web sites, opening the sites,
displaying the images on his computer screen, and then closing the sites”).  However, Tucker I
seems to indicate that the ability to delete alone, without more, would still be sufficient to prove
dominion and control.  150 F. Supp. 2d at 1266–67 (stating that “the ability to destroy is definitive
evidence of control” after a lengthy discussion of various other factors that can indicate dominion
and control); see also supra note 58 and accompanying text.
consider different factors,  they often reach inconsistent outcomes despite78
having reviewed similar facts.  Many courts consider factors such as79
control,  seeking out the image,  knowledge,  and deletion  without80 81 82 83
detailed explanations. This Part evaluates four factors, and their combined
use, in turn.
1.  Dominion and Control
Courts often consider what the defendant can actually do with the
image, usually focusing on the user’s ability to retain the image on the
screen, enlarge it, zoom in or out, copy it, print it, and ultimately delete it.
That is, courts focus on the user’s level of control over the image.  This84
test is similar to the constructive possession test courts often apply in drug
11
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85. See United States v. Tucker (Tucker II), 305 F.3d 1193, 1204 (10th Cir. 2002) (citing
United States v. Simpson, 94 F.3d 1373, 1380 (10th Cir. 1996) (“defining ‘knowing possession’
in the drug context as encompassing situations in which an individual ‘knowingly hold[s] the power
and ability to exercise dominion and control’ over the narcotics”)); see also United States v.
Riccardi, 258 F. Supp. 2d 1212, 1223 (D. Kan. 2003) (“The court believes that the government may
prove knowing possession of child pornography, just as in the case of illegal possession of
weapons, by establishing that a defendant constructively possessed the contraband.”).
86. 150 F. Supp. 2d 1263 (D. Utah 2001).
87. Id. at 1267. 
88. Id. at 1269. 
89. See id. at 1268 (“The images would not have been saved to [the defendant’s] cache file
had [the defendant] not volitionally reached out for them.”); see also State v. Pickett, No. M2004-
00732-CCA-R3-CD, 2005 WL 2438385, at *7 (Tenn. Crim. App. Oct. 3, 2005) (“[A]ppellant
repeatedly reached out for these websites in order to access the images that ended up being stored
in his computer’s temporary Internet file.”).
90. See Pickett, 2005 WL 2438385, at *7.
91. See Fabiano v. Armstrong, 141 P.3d 907, 908 (Colo. Ct. App. 2006); see also Howard,
supra note 67, at 1261.
92. See Howard, supra note 67, at 1261.
93. No. 03-0986, 2003 WL 22994238, at *1 (Va. Cir. Ct. Nov. 12, 2003).
94. Id. at *28–29.
95. Id. at *27.
 possession cases.  The test, therefore, represents an insightful application85
of traditional concepts to a new situation.
In Tucker v. United States (Tucker I),  the court explained that the86
defendant “could control [the images] in many ways:” He could copy
them, print them, enlarge them and “zoom-in,” show them to others, and
copy them to other directories.  Based largely on evidence of control, the87
court found that the defendant possessed the images of child pornography
on his computer.88
2.  Seek and Obtain
Courts have also looked at the defendant’s assertive steps that led to the
viewing or downloading of child pornography images. The courts’ use of
this test often arises in cases involving cache files, when the defendant
argues that he did not intend for the computer to download the file.89
Indications of a user’s actions to seek and obtain child pornography can
include repeated visits to child pornography websites,  a defendant’s90
subscription to child pornography websites,  and search terms related to91
child pornography.  92
In Commonwealth v. Simone,  a search of defendant’s computer93
revealed one image of child pornography that had been manually stored to
the hard drive as well as a series of images that had been stored in the
cache.  In analyzing “whether the defendant knowingly possessed the94
images found in the cache of his computer,”  the court emphasized the95
12
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96. See id. at *33.
97. Id.
98. See United States v. Kuchinski, 469 F.3d 853, 862–63 (9th Cir. 2006) (explaining that
the conviction of the defendant in United States v. Romm, 455 F.3d 990 (9th Cir. 2006), turned on
the fact that the defendant knew that the cache would automatically copy the files). 
99. 72 Va. Cir. 497 (Va. Cir. Ct. 2007).
100. Id. at 498.
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. See infra notes 105–11 and accompanying text. 
104. See infra notes 148–49 and accompanying text.
105. 411 F.3d 1198 (10th Cir. 2005). 
106. Id. at 1200.
defendant’s actions to seek out images involving child pornography.  The96
court considered the search terms employed by the defendant, the
defendant’s possession of stories describing sexual acts by juveniles, and
the possession of the image manually copied onto the hard drive, in
finding that the “defendant reached out for these images with the intent to
control and have dominion over them.”97
3.  Knowledge
Courts have applied knowledge as a factor in different ways. A
common thread, however, is that any indication of knowledge by the
defendant can be quite damning.98
In a remarkably short opinion, the court in Commonwealth v. Gardner99
found that the defendant possessed child pornography based solely on a
statement he made to investigators.  The court held that an inference of100
knowledge could fairly be drawn where the defendant said, “‘I don’t have
too much’ in response to a question [Investigator] DePena asked [the
defendant] about the presence of child pornography on his computer.”101
The court explained that “it would seem that knowledge that a defendant
had child pornography on his computer could be shown by the defendant’s
statements, his knowledge of the operational features of his computer, his
general computer sophistication or other factors.”102
4.  Deletion
Courts often note a defendant’s act to delete pornographic images. This
factor often becomes significant as evidence of knowledge  or control.103 104
In United States v. Bass,  the expert witnesses were unable to determine105
whether the numerous files of child pornography recovered from the
defendant’s computer had been automatically or manually saved.  The106
defendant argued that he merely viewed images on the Internet and was
13
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107. Id. at 1201–02.
108. Id. at 1202.
109. Id. at 1206 (Kelly, J., dissenting).
110. Id. at 1207.
111. Id. 
112. See, e.g., United States v. Tucker (Tucker I), 150 F. Supp. 2d 1263, 1266–68, 1269 n.4
(D. Utah 2001). 
113. No. CR-05-1277, 2007 WL 1228169 (Ala. Crim. App. Apr. 27, 2007).
114. Id. at *3.
115. Id. at *1.
116. Id. at *2.
117. Id.
118. Id. at *3.
119. Id. at *3–8.
120. Id. at *8.
121. Id. 
ignorant of the computer’s cache function.  The court found that the jury107
could have inferred the defendant’s  knowing possession from his use of
certain software to delete the files from his computer.  108
The dissent argued that the majority had rewritten the statute to
criminalize mere viewing of child pornography.  First, the dissent argued109
that there was no evidence that the defendant knew that the images were
being automatically saved to the computer.  Furthermore, the dissent110
pointed out the lack of evidence indicating control over the images.   111
5.  Combinations
Courts often employ more than one of the tests described
above—especially when they seek to reconcile possession of computer
images with the traditional definition of possession.  In Ward v. State,112 113
the defendant viewed images of child pornography on his computer.114
However, the defendant did not manually download the images onto his
hard drive; all images found on his computers by the police were stored in
the cache.  He argued that the statute specifically criminalized possession115
and not viewing,  and argued that he could not be guilty of possessing116
pornographic materials by merely viewing them on a computer screen.117
The court specifically framed the issue as “whether an individual can be
in possession of pornographic materials when he or she has viewed the
pornographic materials on a computer screen but has not copied or saved
those files to the computer.”  After an in-depth study of case law dealing118
with a similar question,  the court explained that “the question becomes:119
Did the defendant specifically seek out the prohibited images and did he
have the ability to exercise dominion and control over those images?”120
The court’s answer to the question was remarkably simple and coherent.
First, the court found that the defendant reached out for the 288 images.121
14
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128. 305 F.3d 1193 (10th Cir. 2002); see also United States v. Tucker (Tucker I), 150 F. Supp.
2d 1263 (D. Utah 2001).
129. 455 F.3d 990 (9th Cir. 2006).
130. 150 F. Supp. 2d 1263 (D. Utah 2001).
131. Id. at 1265.
132. Id.
Then, it found that the defendant had control over the images he was
viewing because he could copy, print, e-mail, or send them to his home
computer.  The court explained that the record did not reveal whether the122
defendant knew that the images would be saved to the cache  or whether123
the defendant actually controlled the images in the manner described.124
However, the court found that the test made his knowledge as to these
factors irrelevant.  Knowledge of the cache was not necessary to125
establish control or reaching out.  Control was established by126
demonstrating what defendant could do to the images, not what he actually
did.127
B.  Courts’ Approach to the Cache
The courts’ applications of the various factors hinge, at least in part, on
the defense raised. In cases involving prosecutions of cached images,
defendants advance two main arguments: (1) lack of knowledge regarding
the cache function, and (2) lack of access to the cached files. In addressing
these arguments, the courts have considered many of the same factors but
have often come to differing conclusions. An analysis of the outcome of
some of these cases reveals the source of the disparity: a limited
understanding of the cache function. In the following analyses of United
States v. Tucker (Tucker II),  and United States v. Romm,  two of the128 129
leading cases in the field, this Note seeks to expose this limitation.
1.  United States v. Tucker
a.  Tucker I
In United States v. Tucker (Tucker I),  the defendant accessed child130
pornography by participating in Internet newsgroups.  He paid a fee and131
received a password that enabled him to visit the websites on which he
viewed child pornography.  When visiting the websites, the defendant132
15
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133. Id. 
134. Id. 
135. Id. The opinion does not say whether Tucker’s deletion of the cache was intended to
delete the images, so as not to have any images left on his computer or if he deleted them because
he knew that he would access different images on his next online visit, making the images on the
cache, whose purpose is to speed subsequent online viewing of the same image, useless. See id. 
136. Id. at 1266.
137. Id. 
138. Id.  Tucker conceded to viewing child pornography but argued that “he never ‘possessed’
or ‘knowingly possessed’ any child pornography.”  Id.
139. Id.
140. “Black’s Law Dictionary defines natural possession as ‘[t]he exercise of physical
detention or control over a thing[.]” Id. at 1266–67 (alteration in original) (emphasis omitted)
(quoting BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1184 (7th ed. 1999)).
141. “‘In order for an individual constructively to possess property, he must knowingly hold
the power and ability to exercise dominion and control over it.’” Id. at 1267 (quoting United States
v. Culpepper, 834 F.2d 879, 881 (10th Cir. 1987)).
142. See id. at 1266–67.
143. Id. at 1267.
144. Id.
145. Id. at 1268 n.4.
would view a series of thumbnails, which he could enlarge and view
further.  The defendant explained that he did not download the images133
onto his computer because he could always access more images.  In fact,134
the defendant testified that he would often clear the cache after viewing
images online, because he could access different images.  A forensic135
search of the defendant’s computer revealed numerous images of child
pornography on his hard drive.  However, all but one of the images were136
found on the cache.  137
During the bench trial, Tucker argued that his viewing of child
pornography did not amount to possession.  In its opinion, the district138
court set forth to resolve two issues: “1) whether Tucker had
possession . . . and 2) whether such possession was knowing
possession.”  The court began by reviewing various definitions of139
possession, including natural possession  and constructive possession.140 141
All the definitions cited by the court included an element of control.142
Accordingly, the court began its analysis of whether defendant had
possession by searching for indications of control in Tucker’s viewing of
the images.  The court explained that “[w]hile the images . . . were on his143
computer screen, he could control them in many ways: he could copy
them . . . ; he could print them . . . ; he could enlarge them and ‘zoom-
in’ . . . ; he could show them to other[s] . . . ; and he could copy them to
other directories[.]”  The court, thus, found that “Tucker ‘possessed’144
child pornography under the simple legal definition of the term.”145
16
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146. Id. at 1268.
147. See id.
148. Id. at 1267. The court found that “[l]ogically, one cannot destroy what one does not
possess and control.” Id. 
149. Id. at 1268.
150. Id. at 1269.
151. United States v. Tucker (Tucker II), 305 F.3d 1193, 1204–05 (10th Cir. 2002).
152. Id.
153. Id. at 1205. 
154. Id. 
In rejecting Tucker’s argument that the download to the cache was
automatic and that he quickly deleted the effects of this process, the court
asserted that the pictures were present only as a result of Tucker’s
volitional visits to the websites.  Furthermore, it interpreted Tucker’s146
actions to delete the cache not as evidence that he did not wish to possess
the images but rather as per se evidence of possession.  The court147
explained that “Tucker also demonstrated ultimate dominion and control
over these images because he was able to destroy them” and that “the
ability to destroy is definitive evidence of control.”  In order to bolster148
its argument, the court likened the situation to drug possession, explaining
that “[j]ust as a possessor of illegal narcotics is not able to escape criminal
liability for possession by throwing drugs out a window, a person who
possesses contraband such as child pornography cannot escape criminal
liability by destroying it.”  Finally, the court found the required element149
of knowledge demonstrated by Tucker’s volitional reach for the images
and by his constant deletion of the cache.150
b.  Tucker II
On appeal from Tucker I, the Tenth Circuit largely agreed with the
district court’s analysis.  The Tenth Circuit noted expert testimony to the151
effect that the images on the cache are subject to the same control, such as
copying and e-mailing, as any other data file.  In rejecting the152
defendant’s argument that he did not voluntarily cache the files and that
he deleted them as soon as possible, the court stated: “Since he knew his
browser cached the image files, each time he intentionally sought out and
viewed child pornography with his Web browser he knowingly acquired
and possessed the images.”  Thus, the court, found that Tucker possessed153
the images in his cache.154
c.  Analysis of Tucker I and Tucker II: Did the Courts Get It Right?
The district court’s application of the simple legal definition of
possession in Tucker I demonstrates how possession of a digital image can
be analyzed similarly to possession of a physical object. The Tucker I
17
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155. Tucker I, 150 F. Supp. 2d at 1267.
156. See supra text accompanying note 144.
157. See supra text accompanying note 145.
158. Tucker I, 150 F. Supp. 2d at 1266–68.
159. Tucker II, 305 F.3d at 1199 (citing Tucker I, 150 F. Supp. 2d at 1268). 
160. Tucker I, 150 F. Supp. 2d at 1267.
court pointed out a series of activities, such as choosing to retain the
image, copying, and zooming, that would establish control in any
situation.  Arguably, the Tucker I court already set forth enough factors155
in its control analysis to find that Tucker controlled and thus possessed, the
images that he had viewed on his monitor.  In fact, the court itself156
explained that it found possession “under the simple legal definition” of
possession.  However, the court continued with a strained effort to157
reconcile the automatic download of the images to the cache with its
previous control analysis.  158
The district court’s explanation of control over the cache seems
wanting despite this point receiving the most attention in the court’s
analysis. The district court essentially offered the same proposition,
arguably with the same flaw, various times. In Tucker II, the court of
appeals restated the same reasoning. The two courts found dispositive the
fact that “[t]he images would not have been saved to his cache file had
Tucker not volitionally reached out for them.” The courts did not159
consider at all how the programming of the computer works to store the
information to the cache automatically. However, if the computer were not
programmed to automatically save Internet images, Tucker could have
viewed and manipulated the images while on the Internet without causing
a file to download onto his hard drive. Obviously, Tucker would have
always had the option to manually download the file, but he would have
had to make a conscious decision to initiate the download. Therefore,
under the analysis applied by the courts, Tucker, with enough knowledge
of the law or programming, could have avoided conviction by simply
ignoring the fact that his computer’s cache existed.
Furthermore, the Tucker I court’s reliance on destruction as dispositive
evidence of control, and thus possession, over the images in the cache, is
plagued with similar shortcomings. The opinion does not indicate that
Tucker knew enough about computers to override the system warnings and
actually access the images on the cache. In fact, the Tucker I court’s
control analysis expressly indicated that Tucker controlled the images
“[w]hile the images . . . were on his computer screen.”  The only160
indication of Tucker’s control over the cache is his manual deletion of the
cache, which, as previously explained, is a fairly simple task that can be
accomplished by a computer user without any knowledge of how to access
18
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161. See supra note 75 and accompanying text.
162. Tucker I, 150 F. Supp. 2d at 1267.
163. Howard, supra note 67, at 1227 & n.†.
164. Id. at 1258.
165. See id.
166. See supra text accompanying note 149.
167. Id.
168. See supra text accompanying note 152.
169. 455 F.3d 990 (9th Cir. 2006).
the information that is actually inside the cache.  Therefore, the court’s161
conclusion that deletion is definitive evidence of control as—“one cannot
destroy what one does not possess” — is flawed. As pointed out by162
Assistant District Attorney Ty E. Howard,  “[t]hat logic falls short,”163
since ability to destroy does not necessarily show possession.  For164
example, every driver on the road has the ability to destroy any scooter,
mailbox, fence or other car in sight by crashing into it.  However, no one165
would say that, as a result, every car driver possesses every scooter,
mailbox, fence, and other car in sight. Alternatively, consider an individual
who borrows a coat from a friend and, later that night, while in the
restroom, notices a small bag of drugs in the pocket. She flushes it down
the toilet immediately. The fact that she destroyed it does not prove that
she possessed the drugs, within the legal definition. The court’s own
words, however, reveal that it reached the opposite conclusion regarding
deletion.  In its proposed comparison to a drug transaction, the court166
explains that one cannot get rid of one’s possession over an item by
destroying the item.  Therefore, the court’s analysis necessarily presumes167
that the item is already possessed; that is, there would be no need to get rid
of the possession if there was no possession initially. This leads to the
question of how the presumed possession arose. The court’s analysis never
ascertains how it is that Tucker possessed the images on the cache before
he deleted them. 
The circuit court’s analysis is more complete because the court at least
includes expert testimony regarding the user’s ability to control images in
the cache.  Arguably, the ability to manipulate these images establishes168
the control necessary to constitute possession. However, there is still no
indication that Tucker had the computer skills necessary to exercise
control over the images in the cache. The end result is that the circuit court
in Tucker II comes closer than the district court to hitting the mark, but it
is still missing a link in the evidentiary chain.
2.  United States v. Romm
In United States v. Romm,  the defendant admitted viewing images of169
child pornography on his computer but argued that “he [could not] be
19
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170. Id. at 993–94 (footnote call number omitted).
171. Id. at 993.
172. Id. at 995.
173. Id.
174. See id. at 995 (“Luckie confirmed that all of the child pornography on Romm’s computer
had been deleted. The vast majority of the images Luckie found had been deleted from Romm’s
internet cache.”).
175. Id. at 994–96, 997–1001. 
176. Id. at 995.
177. Id. at 995–96.
178. See id. Luckie, an expert witness for the Government, testified that Romm either deleted
cache manually by accessing the cache and deleting the files or used the Internet browser to delete
the cache. Id. at 995. Romm’s expert found no evidence that Romm had ever gone into the cache.
Id. at 996.
179. Id. at 998.
180. Id. 
181. Id. at 998–99; see also 18 U.S.C. § 2256(2)(B)(5) (2006) (“‘[V]isual depiction’
includes . . . data stored on computer disk or by electronic means which is capable of conversion
into a visual image[.]”).
182. Romm, 455 F.3d at 1000.
found guilty of possessing . . . child pornography, when he merely viewed
child pornography without ‘downloading’ any of it to his hard drive.”170
In viewing the files online, Romm previewed a series of thumbnails and
enlarged those he wanted.  The facts set forth by the court indicate that,171
in his conversations with the police officers who arrested him, Romm used
the terms “save” and “download” to describe his actions.  Expert172
witnesses for the government testified that all child pornography files had
been deleted from the computer but that images once existed on the hard
drive of the computer.  The opinion suggests that some images might173
have been originally stored outside the cache,  but the portions of the174
expert testimony included in the opinion do not contain this express
finding.  The expert witnesses for both sides explained that images stored175
on the cache are “accessible, albeit ‘system-protected,’”  revealing that176
at least some special knowledge (the location of the cache) is required to
access them.  Finally, none of the expert witnesses concluded that Romm177
had actually accessed the cache on his computer.178
The Ninth Circuit held that there was sufficient evidence of control to
find that Romm possessed the images “in his cache.”  In its analysis, the179
court first found that a user can access an image in the cache.180
Furthermore, the court found that the files in the cache could be converted
into visual images and thus fell within the § 2252A definition of “visual
depiction.”  The court found that Romm “exercised control over the181
cached images while they were contemporaneously saved to his cache and
displayed on his screen.”  The court distinguished Romm’s control over182
the images from the saving of images to the cache that occurs when an
20
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183. Id.
184. Id. at 1000–01.
185. See id. at 998–99.
individual accidentally views a pop-up. The court explained that Romm’s
intentional searching and viewing of images, rather than an accidental pop-
up, resulted in the images that were saved in the cache.  The court183
stressed the coincidence of Romm’s control over the image on the screen
and the download to the cache and found that “Romm had access to, and
control over, the images that were displayed on his screen and saved to his
cache.”184
The circuit court found control, and thus possession, over the image on
the screen but convicted Romm of possession of—not that image—but the
copy of that image in (the cached image). The reason behind this bizarre
outcome is that Romm’s control over the image on the screen occurred at
the same time that cached image was created.  A hypothetical may help185
illustrate the difference:
Let us assume that Linda has bought the latest high definition DVD
player to watch movies in her home. The DVD player was actually
developed by a computer genius (Gino) whose goal is to have a copy of
every movie ever created. For such purposes, Gino has programmed the
hundreds of DVD players that he plans to sell with a mechanism that
copies movies as they are being watched with the DVD player. The copy
is saved to a “superchip” that is hidden in the underside of the DVD
player. The superchip continues to automatically store movies until it is
full, at which time it erases itself. Alternatively, the superchip’s contents
are deleted if the user resets the DVD player for any reason. The owners
of the DVD players do not know about the superchip and have no way to
access the superchip. Gino has offered free maintenance of the DVD
players in hopes that buyers will call him to their houses so that he can use
his personal supercomputer to get the movies from the superchip. Once
Gino accesses the superchip, he can play the movies stored inside just like
any other movie.
The point of the hypothetical is to illustrate the difference between the
movie that Linda is viewing on her screen and the movie that goes into the
superchip. Linda can control the movie on her television screen by pausing
it, re-starting it, fast-forwarding, re-winding it, and even removing it from
her television screen by removing the DVD from the DVD player.
Ignoring the physical disk on which the movie is recorded, it can be said
that Linda possesses the movie on her screen because her ability to re-wind
it, restart it, or remove it gives her dominion and control over the movie
on the screen. However, Linda cannot assert her control over the copy of
the movie stored on the superchip. The copy of the movie in the superchip,
despite being identical to the movie that Linda is watching on her screen,
21
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186. Cf. supra note 66 and accompanying text (discussing the mechanisms by which the cache
creates a different file from that which is represented on the screen).
187. See supra text accompanying note 182.
188. See supra notes 175–78 and accompanying text.
189. See supra note 75 and accompanying text (discussing deleting the cache).
190. See supra notes 175–78 and accompanying text.
191. See supra note 72 and accompanying text.
is a completely different “object” from the movie on the screen.  The186
mere fact that the copy on the superchip was created at the same time that
Linda had control over the movie on the screen does not give her any more
control over the movie on the superchip than if the copy were created at
some other time.
Merging the analogy into the Romm court’s holding, the court would
find that Romm “exercised control over the [movies in the superchip]
while they were contemporaneously saved to [the superchip] and displayed
on his [TV] screen.”  No case law supports the court’s finding.187
Establishing control over the independent copy requires an independent
analysis of the ability to control that item. Although a computer user with
enough knowledge could access the images in the cache, expert witness
testimony included by the Romm court in the opinion reveals no evidence
that Romm ever accessed the images in the cache.  The only apparent188
indication of control over the cache was the deletion of the images in the
cache, which can occur for any number of reasons.  In fact, the expert189
witnesses were also unable to pinpoint whether the images on the cache
were deleted automatically because the cache was full, deleted by the user
using the browser—a fairly simple procedure that can be done by the
average computer user—or manually deleted from the cache.  Therefore,190
the court in its opinion relied on insufficient evidence to establish control
over the images in the cache of Romm’s computer. Thus, there was
insufficient evidence to establish possession over the images located in
Romm’s cache.
V.  PROPOSED UNIFORM SOLUTION
A.  The Underlying Framework
It is an easy stretch to extend the intuitive idea of possession to include
an image that a user has actively downloaded onto his hard drive.
However, it might not be as easy to extend that idea to an image inside a
cache file, which the user did not intentionally place there and most likely
cannot access.  The courts’ reluctance to find possession where it is191
apparent that defendants had no knowledge about the cache is
22
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192. See, e.g., United States v. Kuchinski, 469 F.3d 853, 863 (9th Cir. 2006) (“Where a
defendant lacks knowledge about the cache files, and concomitantly lacks access to and control
over those files, it is not proper to charge him with possession and control of the child pornography
images located in those files, without some other indication of dominion and control over the
images. To do so turns abysmal ignorance into knowledge and a less than valetudinarian grasp into
dominion and control.”).
193. Alternatively, it encourages evasive planning and deceit by child pornography viewers.
Taking their cue from the case law inferring knowledge of the cache from simple tasks such as
clearing it, users could learn not to cover their tracks at all in efforts to fool courts into thinking that
they have no knowledge of the cache. See United States v. Bass, 411 F.3d 1198, 1202 (10th Cir.
2005) (finding sufficient evidence of knowledge of the cache where defendant used two programs
in attempts to remove child pornography from his computer so that his mother would not find it).
194. Compare supra Part III.B (discussing downloading), with supra Part III.C (explaining
viewing without downloading and the effect of cache memory).
195. See supra Part III.C. The courts seem to ignore the third kind of user, the one that falls
between the person that has no idea about cache and the person that knows about it but does not
have full access to it. The latter knows about cache and how it works but does not know how to
access the images inside it. See id. This third person has no more access to the images in the cache
than the first person who has no idea that cache exists. However, this individual tends to be viewed
by courts as no different from the person that has full access to the cache. See supra Part IV.B.1;
see also Bass, 411 F.3d at 1202. An example helps demonstrate the difference in the three
situations:
Three Buyers seek out their usual dealer and purchase some marijuana, which they consume
immediately. The dealer is competing with another dealer and has decided to give his customers
a surprise bonus for the rest of the week. After the transaction, the dealer rides his bike to each of
the three customers’ houses and throws a bag of marijuana through each of their bathroom
windows. Buyer 1 knows nothing about the promotion. His bathroom door is broken and he is using
another bathroom, so Buyer 1 never finds the promotional bag. Buyer 2 had bought from the dealer
this week and knows about the promotion, but his bathroom door is also broken. He has no access
to the bathroom. Buyer 3 knows about the promotion, and has full access to his bathroom. As a
final note, the dealer happens to be a very determined person who would have thrown the
promotional bags in the windows even if the three Buyers were not interested in receiving them.
In fact, Buyer 2 would very much prefer that the dealer did not drop anything off at his house, and,
if he had access to the bathroom, he would close the window in order to prevent the delivery from
occurring. After the delivery, Buyer 2 inserts a thin pole through his window, which he uses to push
the bonus bag into the toilet (he cannot actually bring it out the window), and flushes it. His
understandable.  However, it also seems unreasonable that a person that192
willingly accessed, viewed, and arguably controlled images of child
pornography would not be convicted as a result of his ignorance regarding
the workings of computer cache.
This situation is problematic for three reasons. First, it encourages
willful blindness.  Second, it would result in disparate treatment between193
those choosing to download images from a website and those with enough
legal knowledge to understand that they should view the images without
downloading them, even though both have the same control over the image
while it is on their screen.  Finally, courts’ holdings become even more194
contradictory because many of those who know about a computer’s cache
are unlikely to be able to access it.195
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neighbor sees him and calls the police.
So far, most would agree that Buyer 3 possesses the bonus bag and Buyer 1 does not possess
the bonus bag. But what about Buyer 2? The only difference between Buyer 1 and Buyer 2 is that
Buyer 2 happens to know that the promotion exists. It seems unreasonable that Buyer 2 would be
liable for taking steps to destroy something that he never wanted and never had access to, but Buyer
1 is not liable at all because Buyer 1 did nothing. Furthermore, it would also likely be a difficult
task to demonstrate that Buyer 2 did have knowledge of the promotion if he had chosen to do
nothing about the drugs in his bathroom.
Similarly, in the context of possession of images in the cache, it is difficult to demonstrate that
a defendant has knowledge of the workings of the cache. Both the Tucker and Romm courts seem
to be looking for something beyond just “some knowledge” of the cache’s existence. However, the
outcomes of the two cases allow an argument that the user need not have access to the cache before
he possesses the images in them.
196. Howard, supra note 67, at 1254. Cf. State v. Jensen, 173 P.3d 1046, 1051, 1052–53 (Ariz.
Ct. App. 2008) (focusing on the use of the screen and distinguishing Romm and Tucker, among
other precedent and finding that there could be knowing receipt of images of child pornography
regardless of whether the defendant “intended to save them or knew his computer was saving
them”).
197. Howard, supra note 67, at 1255.
198. Id. at 1254–55.
199. Id. 
200. See United States v. Riccardi, 258 F. Supp. 2d 1212, 1224 (D. Kan. 2003) (“This
evidence [of saving images onto the computer] suggests that Mr. Riccardi took affirmative steps
to preserve the child pornography on his computer and, therefore, knowingly possessed such
As unearthed by Ty E. Howard, a large part of the problem underlying
the confusion in this area of the law is the fact that courts do not tend to
recognize the existence of two distinct possible approaches to possession
of a digital image. Under the first approach—the “evidence of possession
approach”—images stored in the cache are accepted as evidence of prior
possession. Under the second approach—the “present possession
approach”—the images in the cache are the objects actually being
possessed.  Under the “evidence of possession approach,” the defendant196
is charged with possession of the image that was once on the screen,197
whereas under the “present possession approach” the defendant is charged
with possession of the cached file itself.198
1.  Present Possession Approach
The two approaches lead to two very different kinds of cases that are
open to different legal arguments and different evidence. In the “present
possession approach,” the defendant is prosecuted for possessing whatever
files are presently in the computer, be they cached files or manually saved
files.  A case within this framework will revolve around the element of199
knowledge. Proving knowing possession of manually saved files is not
difficult because the process of manually saving the file demonstrates that
control is apparent to the user.  However, knowledge becomes a primary200
24
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items . . . .”).
201. Defendants often defend by arguing a lack of knowledge of the cache. See United States
v. Kuchinski, 469 F.3d 853, 862 (9th Cir. 2006); United States v. Bass, 411 F.3d 1198, 1202 (10th
Cir. 2005).
202. Howard, supra note 67, at 1257.
203. See United States v. Tucker (Tucker I), 150 F. Supp. 2d 1263, 1268 (D. Utah 2001)
(responding to defendant’s arguments that defendant did not cause the images to be downloaded
onto the cache and that defendant immediately deleted them when he logged off the Internet).
204. See Bass, 411 F.3d at 1202 (interpreting the defendant’s use of programs to delete child
pornography files from his computer as evidence of knowledge).
205. See, e.g., United States v. Romm, 455 F.3d 990, 995 (9th Cir. 2006).
206. See United States v. Tucker (Tucker II), 305 F.3d 1193, 1204–05 (10th Cir. 2002).
207. See supra Part IV.B.2.
208. See Howard, supra note 67, at 1254–55. 
209. For examples of courts indicating that passive viewing does not constitute possession,
see United States v. Stulock, 308 F.3d 922, 925 (8th Cir. 2002), which quoted without disapproval
the district court’s finding “that one cannot be guilty of possession for simply having viewed an
image on a web site.” See also United States v. Perez, 247 F. Supp. 2d 459, 484 n.12 (S.D.N.Y.
2003); Strouse v. State, 932 So. 2d 326, 328 n.3 (Fla. 4th DCA 2006). For examples of defendants
issue where the defendant has not manually downloaded the images and
is being prosecuted for possessing the images in the cache.  Defendants201
being prosecuted for possessing images in the cache often contend that
they did not know that the images were downloaded to the cache  or,202
alternatively, that they did not want the images to be downloaded to the
cache.  Since the argument concerns the defendant’s state of mind, it is203
not difficult for him to make, and the prosecution’s evidence to the
contrary is often circumstantial.  As a result, the evidence presented204
involves expert testimony regarding the source of the images and the
process through which images are downloaded to the cache.205
Furthermore, since many courts rely on indicia of control in finding
possession, a battle of the experts arises, where experts on both sides
indicate that the cache is located in a system-protected area of the
computer and express their opinions as to whether the defendant ever
manually accessed the cache.  Case law reveals that establishing knowing206
possession of the cache can be a daunting task that can lead to
questionable outcomes.  Finally, this approach rewards informed207
offenders by effectively immunizing individuals who have enough legal
knowledge to avoid manually downloading files and enough computer
skill to fully disable the cache function and browser memory.
2.  Evidence of Possession Approach
In the “evidence of possession approach,” the defendant is prosecuted
for possessing the image that was once on the screen.  This approach can208
be attacked because many possession statutes do not speak to viewing and
some will argue that mere viewing does not constitute possession.209
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arguing that mere viewing does not constitute possession, see supra note 64 and accompanying text.
210. See United States v. Tucker (Tucker I), 150 F. Supp. 2d 1263, 1267 (D. Utah 2001); see
also State v. Jensen, 173 P.3d 1046, 1050, 1052 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2008) (“Contrary to [the
defendant]’s contention, the act of intentionally searching for and accessing a website for child
pornography is not the equivalent of merely looking at a picture in a museum.”).
211. Jensen, 173 P.3d at 1050, 1052.
212. See supra note 196 and accompanying text.
213. See, e.g., supra Part IV.B.2.
214. See Howard, supra note 67, at 1253–64 (discussing further the application of the two
frameworks in diverse situations).
215. See id.
However, these arguments can be defeated with proof that the user
controlled the images on the screen.  Evidence of control can establish210
that the defendant was not a passive viewer.  Furthermore, since the user211
can easily see the image on the screen, the user cannot argue a lack of
knowledge of his possession over the image. Therefore, under this
approach, the application of the law to the facts becomes simpler.
It is not uncommon to find courts straddling the line between the
“present possession” and “evidence of possession” approaches.  A failure212
to understand the difference between the two approaches can lead to
confusing outcomes.  A functional definition of what constitutes213
possession of child pornography, as a threshold matter, requires a choice
between these two approaches. The ability to limit uncertainty surrounding
the element of knowledge makes the “evidence of possession” approach
considerably easier to apply.  The use of this approach would limit the214
complicated arguments about the workings of the cache. Defendants would
no longer be able to plead ignorance of how the computer works because
they would be being prosecuted for possessing an item that they could
clearly see on the screen. The court would then be free to focus on factors
more closely related to traditional determinations of possession. 
It is likely that courts might, as a matter of policy, be concerned about
an approach that finds possession in the mere viewing of an image.
However, the choice set forth by Ty E. Howard’s framework is just the
first step in the analytical process.  As applied in this Note, the purpose215
of the framework is not to actually test for possession of child pornography
but to guide the court in its examination of the evidence that will establish
possession of child pornography. 
B.  Proposed Test
1.  Explanation of Proposed Test
There are many ways to access child pornography through the Internet.
Although most of them require a user’s active participation, it is possible
26
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216. GAO REPORT, supra note 47, at 2.
217. Howard, supra note 67, at 1249. Academic commentary has largely concentrated on the
area of virtual child pornography. See Jason Baruch, Comment, Constitutional Law: Permitting
Virtual Child Pornography—A First Amendment Requirement, Bad Policy, or Both?, 55 FLA. L.
REV. 1073 (2003).
218. See supra notes 13, 141–43 and accompanying text.
to encounter child pornography unintentionally.  An adopted test should216
therefore cast a net narrow enough to exclude an accidental viewer, no
matter how much adult pornography the person chooses to view but wide
enough to catch all those who actually desire to find child pornography.
Furthermore, the test should take into account the pattern displayed by
case law, where willing viewers defend themselves by proving a lack of
computer sophistication and should seek to avoid rewarding the feigned
ignorance of defendants.
So far, courts have been generally unsuccessful at developing a test that
can be applied uniformly to all the situations above, and academic
commentary on the subject is scarce.  However, after making the choice217
to view cache as evidence of possession, the task of choosing a test that
will work in all situations becomes manageable.
This Note proposes a test that combines the often considered
“dominion and control” and “seek to obtain” factors into a two-part test.
This combination would allow the courts to include all willing viewers of
child pornography in its net while excluding all accidental recipients. First,
the dominion and control portion of the test allows possession of electronic
child pornography to align with the courts’ traditional definition of
possession.  The approach calls for a concentration on indications of218
viewer control such as the user’s ability to view for as long as he wants,
and the ability to enlarge, zoom, copy, download, share, print, edit, and
close the image on the screen. These activities readily compare with
activities that a person handling a paper copy of child pornography in a
magazine could engage in: the person can look at each image for as long
as he wants, unfold a larger center-fold if one is available, use a
magnifying glass to look at the image in more detail, make a copy using
a photocopy machine, show it to a friend, make a copy for a friend to take
home with them, and choose to destroy the whole magazine or simply put
it away.
In the second part of the test, the “seek to obtain” portion serves the
dual purpose of: (1) ensuring that only those individuals who specifically
sought out child pornography, as opposed to those searching for adult
pornography, are convicted, and (2) allowing the prosecution of those who
did not intend to find child pornography but sought to keep it once they
found it. The test would operate much as it has before, allowing courts to
27
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219. See United States v. Carani, 492 F.3d 867, 871 (7th Cir. 2007).
220. See supra text accompanying note 77; see also United States v. Tucker (Tucker I), 150
F. Supp. 2d 1263, 1265 (D. Utah 2001).
221. Although generally not conclusive, the number of images of child pornography found on
the defendant’s drive often make up part of a court’s finding. Howard, supra note 67, at 1263
n.183; see, e.g., United States v. Romm, 455 F.3d 990, 993 (9th Cir. 2006) (counting forty-two
images); Ward v. State, No. CR-05-1277, 2007 WL 1228169, at *1 (Ala. Crim. App. Apr. 27, 2007)
(counting 288 images); Commonwealth v. Simone, No. 03-0986, 2003 WL 22994238, at *28 (Va.
Cir. Ct. Nov. 12, 2003) (counting 260 images). A large number of child pornography images in
proportion to the total number of adult pornographic images also found on a computer would be
evidence weighing against a defendant’s arguments that child pornography was accidentally found
while searching for adult pornography.
222. See supra notes 66–70 and accompanying text (emphasizing the knowledge requirement
in the statutes). 
223. See cases cited supra note 81.
224. In United States v. Carani, the defendant contended that any child pornography images
found on his computer had been downloaded inadvertently while searching for adult pornography,
and he argued that he was not knowledgeable about computers. 492 F.3d at 870–71. However, a
search of the hard drive by law enforcement revealed more than 5,000 images of child pornography.
Id. at 871. “[Law enforcement agents] concluded that Carani was actively seeking out child
pornography, as a home computer would not otherwise contain so many references to terms
associated with child pornography[,]” and testified at trial that “[the child pornography] videos
were not downloaded in large chunks along with adult pornography; rather, they were downloaded
along with other child pornography, in groups of five or six.” Id. The jury found the defendant
guilty of possession of child pornography. Id. at 872. The Seventh Circuit held that “[t]he
government presented evidence sufficient for the jury to infer that Carani suspected that files he
was downloading and sharing with others contained child pornography[.]” Id. at 874.
225. See supra text accompanying notes 45–46.
look at the search terms used by the defendant,  the websites to which the219
defendant subscribes,  and the number of images of child pornography220
found on the defendant’s computer as evidence of a defendant’s intent to
seek out images of child pornography specifically.  The knowledge221
element of the statute would thus be satisfied,  and the purpose behind222
the statute would be promoted.  The user’s specific choices would be223
strong evidence indicating whether or not the user searched for child
pornography, and therefore evidence of the user’s knowledge of the
images being downloaded.  Since courts and experts have often stated224
that the terms employed to search for child pornography are specific and,
consequently, distinguishable from the terms used to search for adult
pornography,  individuals searching strictly for adult pornography would,225
under this prong of the test, be able to demonstrate that they were not
seeking child pornography.
The test does not embody a set number of child-pornography related
search terms or images that would be dispositive about whether the
defendant sought out child pornography. These specified indicators, as
well as any others not included here, are proposed as circumstantial
28
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226. Cf. State v. Jensen, 173 P.3d 1046, 1050, 1052 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2008) (discussing how
knowledge may be inferred from circumstantial evidence and stating that “internet searches for this
kind of material is evidence that the computer operator knew what he was going to and did
receive”).
227. See supra note 224 and accompanying text.
228. No. 03-0986, 2003 WL 22994238 (Va. Cir. Ct. Nov. 12, 2003).
229. Id. at *33. 
230. Jensen, 173 P.3d at 1052.
evidence  of the defendant’s actions to seek out child pornography. For226
example, consider the case of a defendant who is arguing that he only
intended to obtain adult pornography but sometimes found child
pornography, where expert testimony indicates the presence of 500 images
of child pornography and 500 images of adult pornography in the
computer.  In such a case, the predominance of child pornography227
images—fifty percent of the total—would be circumstantial evidence of
the defendant’s actions to seek out both adult pornography and child
pornography specifically because it is highly unlikely that searches for
adult pornography would return child pornography images fifty percent of
the time.
At the same time the “seek-to-obtain” prong will also address the
situation where an individual accidentally views or receives child
pornography but then, instead of destroying it, seeks to keep it. This
reasoning is expressed in Commonwealth v. Simone,  which explained:228
By analogy, one might consider the following
hypothetical. If a person walks down the street and notices an
item (such as child pornography or an illegal narcotic) whose
possession is prohibited, has that person committed a criminal
offense if they look at the item for a sufficient amount of time
to know what it is and then walks away? The obvious answer
seems to be “no.” However, if the person looks at the item
long enough to know what it is, then reaches out and picks it
up, holding and viewing it and taking it with them to their
home, that person has moved from merely viewing the item
to knowingly possessing the item by reaching out for it and
controlling it. In the same way, the defendant in this case
reached out for prohibited items and, in essence, took them
home.  229
A person who accidentally comes across child pornography has a
choice between getting rid of it or keeping it. The person who makes the
choice of immediately getting rid of the child pornography by destroying
it or throwing it away never sought to possess. This person “has not
formed the requisite knowledge, and is lacking the necessary mens rea.”230
However, an individual who accidentally finds child pornography and
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231. Id. at 1049–50 (“[T]hat same person could be in possession of the unlawful image if it
is retained.”).
232. See supra text accompanying notes 113–27.
decides to retain it has, at the point in which they decide to keep it, reached
out for the image of child pornography.  This analysis is useful in an e-231
mail situation where the defendant does not solicit the child pornography.
His conscious decision to keep the e-mail would establish possession,
whereas a decision to quickly delete would establish the opposite.
2.  Application of the Proposed Test to Existing Case Law
The joint application of these two factors can lead to a cohesive
analysis.  The application of the entire framework proposed in this Note232
would also have resulted in stronger opinions in both Tucker and Romm.
First, a large part of the complication that the Tucker courts faced
would be resolved by taking the evidence of possession approach. Both the
appellate and the district courts spent a great deal of time trying to
establish control over the images in the cache. Under the proposed test,
that analysis would become superfluous once it was established that the
defendant had control over the image on the screen. As evidenced by
Tucker I, there was ample evidence of the defendant’s control over the
images on the screen. The next step would be to establish that the
defendant sought out the images. The courts could have looked at the
evidence regarding what searches the defendant ran and at the prominence
of child pornography relative to other types of files on his computer as
evidence that the defendant affirmatively sought out child pornography.
In this way, the court could have proven knowing constructive possession
with a simpler analysis than either court employed. Furthermore, the
questionable assertions regarding deletion as per se evidence of control
would become unnecessary, leading to a stronger opinion.
Similarly, the courts could have established possession in Romm
without resorting to the argument that the defendant controlled the images
that were created in the cache while Romm controlled the images on the
screen. In fact, if both the Tucker and Romm courts had applied this
proposed test, the opinions could sound remarkably similar. Romm’s
control would be proven by his ability to manipulate the images while they
were on his screen, and his seeking out of the images could be
demonstrated with expert testimony of the search terms he used. These
opinions would thus reinforce each other, creating strong precedent for
what constitutes possession of electronic child pornography.
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233. Child pornography has been available through other mediums since before the advent of
the Internet in the early 1990s. See, e.g., Jacobson v. United States, 503 U.S. 540, 547 (1992)
(prosecution for mail receipt of magazines containing child pornography); United States v. Driscoll,
No. 94-3591, 1995 WL 368839, at *2 (7th Cir. June 20, 1995) (prosecution for possession and
transportation of child pornography in VHS form).
234. GAO REPORT, supra note 47, at 1 (“In recent years, child pornography has become
increasingly available as it has migrated . . . to the World Wide Web. As you know, a great strength
of the Internet is that it includes a wide range of search and retrieval technologies that make finding
information fast and easy.”).
235. See supra text accompanying notes 2–8.
236. See supra note 79 and accompanying text.
237. See supra text accompanying note 52.
VI.  CONCLUSION
Bans on possession of child pornography seek to protect children who
are irreparably harmed in its production. Possession of child pornography
is not by nature an Internet crime;  however, the Internet’s speed, ease of233
use, and offer of anonymity have made the web a convenient way to access
child pornography.  It can be expected that the Internet will continue to234
dominate as the most common medium to access child pornography. 
The law has struggled to keep pace with technology in this field. In
establishing whether there is possession of digital data, many courts have
relied on internal computer processes that the user cannot see. The result
has been complication and inconsistency. Under current case law, an avid
consumer of child pornography whose computer contains evidence of
thousands of images of child pornography, would, if prosecuted in the
Ninth Circuit, not be held liable if he argues that he did not know about his
computer’s cache.  In contrast, the same avid consumer would be held235
liable if prosecuted in Arizona state court.236
As proposed in this Note, a test that may be applied to any digital
possession scenario would lead to more uniform outcomes. A focus on the
user’s search and the user’s ability to control and manipulate the image
displayed on the screen would enable the courts to concentrate on what the
user can see on the screen rather than concentrating on internal processes
that the user does not see. The requisite proof under such a test is clear:
The prosecution must establish that the user sought out child pornography
and, once found, the user could manipulate and control the images. The
user’s degree of computer sophistication—beyond the ability to search and
control images off websites—becomes irrelevant. The result is more
certainty and predictability because outcomes would no longer vary
according to each user’s computer sophistication. Furthermore,
concentrating on the volitional consumption of child pornography is
consistent with the interest of protecting the young victims of child
pornography.237
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